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Abstract
The European Court of Justice has held that as from 21 December 2012 insurers may no 
longer treat men and women differently on the basis of their sex, thus prohibiting ‘gender-
rating’ in insurance and related financial services throughout the European Union. In this 
article I look into the legislative and judicial processes leading up to this outcome as well as 
to the judgment itself in order to shed light on how the unisex rule came to be. I reflect 
upon what happened to sex as an actuarial factor and try to draw some conclusions on 
what the future might bring us, not only in the subject of sex discrimination but also taking 
into consideration the European Commission’s existing proposal on a similar directive 
touching upon the use of age and disability as actuarial factors. I conclude that although it 
is currently very difficult, perhaps impossible to provide an admissible justification for the 
practice of gender-rating, this does not mean that we should stop testing, as the premise on 
which the absolutist version of the unisex rule rest that gender-rating is always
incompatible with the principle of non-discrimination has yet to be validated. I also 
conclude that there is good cause to believe that in the field of personal insurance age 
should continue to be used as a risk factor, but that some of the current practices involving 
both age and disability as risk factors might not pass the test of compatibility with the 
fundamental rights of the European Union.
Keywords: discrimination; inequality; segmentation; risk factors; sex; gender; age; disability; 
Test-Achats.
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Justice has held that as from 21 December 2012 insurers may no 
longer treat men and women differently on the basis of their sex, thus prohibiting ‘gender-
rating’ in insurance and related financial services throughout the European Union (Test-
Achats, 2011).1
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In Section 2 of this article I look into the legislative and judicial processes leading up to this 
outcome as well as to the judgment itself in order to shed light on how the unisex rule 
came to be. I observe how this rule came into being in its first life, its effectiveness 
significantly impaired by a so-called derogation, and how it took on an absolutist turn in its 
second, current life by virtue of the prospective invalidation of that derogation by the ECJ. 
I note that in the legislative process that led to the EU Gender Directive (2004) the 
absolutist version of the rule failed to obtain the unanimous approval of Member States 
and, in the judicial process that followed, the assumption upon which it rests that taking 
one’s sex into account as a risk factor in the formulation of private insurance contracts is 
always incompatible with the fundamental rights of the European Union was never directly 
scrutinized by the ECJ.
In Section 3 I reflect upon what happened to sex as an actuarial factor and try to draw 
some conclusions on what the future might bring us, not only in the subject of sex 
discrimination but also taking into consideration the European Commission’s existing 
Proposal on a similar directive touching upon the use of age and disability as actuarial 
factors (2008). I conclude that there is no substantive justification for the absolutist version 
of the unisex rule, as the premise that gender-rating is always incompatible with the 
principle of non-discrimination has yet to be validated. I also conclude that from a formal 
point of view there should be no cause for concern with a possible re-run of the ECJ’s 
argument in Test-Achats, there being no inherent contradiction in the insurance-related 
provisions of the Proposal, as amended by the European Parliament (2009), and that from 
a substantial point of view there is good cause to believe that insurers will be able to 
provide evidence in support of the conclusion that in the field of personal insurance age 
should continue to be used as a risk factor, but that some of the current practices involving 
both age and disability as risk factors might not pass the test of compatibility with the 
fundamental rights of the European Union. 
                                                                                                                                              
1 Although this is often left unstated, I believe that statistical data used by insurers is based on biological sex, 
not gender. However, the expression ‘gender-rating’ is widely used in the literature. I shall use it as a reference 
to insurers’ use of sex as a rating variable.
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2. A WAKE-UP CALL: AN OUTRIGHT BAN ON GENDER RATING IN 
INSURANCE
2.1.The EU Gender Directive and the Test-Achats ruling
Article 5(1) of the EU Gender Directive (2004) generally prohibits the practice of ‘gender 
rating’ in insurance: the use of sex as an actuarial factor in the calculation of premiums and 
benefits for the purposes of insurance and related financial services.2
Reference is made in the EU Gender Directive to the universal right to equality before the 
law and protection against discrimination for all persons (EU Gender Directive, 2004, 
Recital 2) and to the fundamental principle of equality between men and women as set 
forth in Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.3
Such provisions would ‘require equality between men and women to be ensured in all 
areas’ (EU Gender Directive, 2004, Recital 4). The prevention of sex discrimination would 
require men and women not to be treated differently when they are placed ‘in a comparable 
situation’. Differences in treatment which ‘result from the physical differences between 
men and women do not relate to comparable situations and therefore do not constitute 
discrimination’ (EU Gender Directive, 2004, Recital 12). Otherwise, ‘differences in 
treatment may be accepted only if they are justified by a legitimate aim’ (EU Gender 
Directive, 2004, Recital 16).
The EU Gender Directive aimed to achieve ‘a common high level of protection against 
discrimination in all the Member States’, a purpose which ‘cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, 
be better achieved at Community level’ (EU Gender Directive, 2004, Recital 28). In 
insurance, the promotion of equal treatment between men and women would require the 
use of sex as an actuarial factor not to ‘result in differences in individuals’ premiums and 
benefits’ (EU Gender Directive, 2004, Recital 18). Such is the explanation provided for the 
general prohibition contained in Article 5(1) of the EU Gender Directive.
And yet the effectiveness of the unisex rule on the insurance business would be 
significantly impaired by the derogation contained in Article 5(2) of the EU Gender 
Directive, which permitted the application of proportionate differences in individuals’ 
                                                
2 This directive was a follow-up to The EU Race Directive (2000) (EU Gender Directive, 2004, Recital 10). 
However, there are no insurance-specific provisions in the EU Race Directive. In addition to these, there was 
the EU Employment Equality Directive (2000). It laid down a general framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment 
and occupation. Although it does not mention insurance, it is a direct precedent to the European 
Commission’s Proposal, 2008. Both stem from what is now Art. 19(1) TFEU.
3 Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the Charter has the same legal 
force as the treaties of the European Union.
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premiums and benefits ‘where the use of sex is a determining factor in the assessment of 
risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data’.4
This derogation was exclusive of costs related to pregnancy and maternity, on the ground, 
it would appear, that the economic burden of human reproduction should not be allowed 
to rest on women’s shoulders alone (EU Gender Directive, 2004, Article 5(3) and Recital 
20). In this case, the implementation of measures aimed at complying with the unisex rule 
at national level could at best be deferred by Member States for a period of up to 2 years as 
from 21 December 2007, the date of entry into force of the EU Gender Directive. The 
derogation contained in Article 5(2) more generously determined that Member States 
which had chosen to rely on the derogation – and all Member States did make use of this 
opt-out provision – were to review their decision by 21 December 2012.
The ECJ did not wait for such a decision to be made by Member States: on 1 March 2011, 
in what would be known as the Test-Achats ruling, the Court declared that this derogation 
would cease to be effective on 21 December 2012 (European Commission’s 
Communication, 2011, Para 3).
In order to assist Member States with the implementation of the Test-Achats ruling at 
national level, the European Commission issued a Communication on 22 December 2011. 
In this Communication, the European Commission recognized that this ruling would have 
implications in all Member States, given that all Member States still allowed gender 
differentiation for at least one type of insurance: life insurance (European Commission’s 
Communication, 2011, Para 3). So that there would remain no doubts as to the bearing of 
the Test-Achats ruling, the European Commission issued the following guideline to all 
Members States:
As from 21 December 2012, the unisex rule contained in Article 5(1) must be applied without 
any possible exception in relation to the calculation of individuals’ premiums and benefits in 
new contracts.5
                                                
4 In Recital 19, the English version of the EU Gender Directive qualifies the rule of Article 5(2) as an 
‘exemption’ to that of Article 5(1), whereas the French version uses the term ‘derogation’ instead. Similar 
differences may be observed amongst the other official languages of this directive, the Italian and Portuguese 
versions using the equivalent to the French ‘derogation’, the German, Dutch and Spanish versions referring 
to an ‘exception’ to the rule. I am unfamiliar with the remaining official languages. In Test-Achats, the ECJ 
mostly uses the term ‘derogation’, possibly because French is both the Court’s official working language and 
the language of the case, which originated in Belgium.
5 European Commission’s Communication, 2011, Para 5 (stress added). On 6 February 2014, EIOPA—the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority—issued a Report on the implementation of the 
Test-Achats ruling into national legislation, according to which in December 2013 it had already been 
implemented in 25 out of the current 28 Member States. According to this Report, in the three Member 
States where the Test-Achats ruling had not yet been implemented there was legislation to that effect in the 
process of being adopted. Such Member States were Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal.
Proceedings of the 16th Annual Conference of the Insurance Law Association 
of Serbia. Insurance law, governance and transparency: basics of the legal 





2.2.How this rule came to be
In an earlier paper I have put forward the view that the Test-Achats ruling, whilst 
constituting a most welcome landmark in the pursuit of equality between men and women, 
had nonetheless gone too far by saying too little on the question of what separates 
admissible criteria of differentiation from inadmissible forms of discrimination (Rego, 
2014).
This was a landmark decision marking a sharp turn away from the traditional view that 
insurers should be allowed to apply just about any risk assessment criterion, so long as it is 
sustained by the findings of actuarial science. It was not the first time that a judicial 
decision had ever exposed the naïveté behind the assumption that insurers’ recourse to 
statistical data and probabilistic analysis, given their scientific nature, would suffice to keep 
them out of harm’s way.6 However, the shockwaves it sent across Europe and the rest of 
the world were unprecedented, possibly because it was the first time such a universal ban 
on the use of sex as an actuarial factor had been put in place (Sass, 2014, 228-229). As 
stated in a recent international report, ‘[m]ost countries in the world have responded to the 
judgment in some way or another, and whether in the EU or not, the number of 
publications generated on the judgment has appeared to sensitise insurers universally of 
discrimination issues in insurance practices’ (Kuschke, 2010, 31). I believe it would be fair 
to conclude that in the field of discrimination in insurance there is a before and an after 
Test-Achats.
No argument is made in this article against the decision in Test-Achats. However, it should 
be noted that in setting out the reasoning behind this decision the ECJ never found it 
necessary to answer the main question of substance which permeated the dispute – a 
question which had been thus phrased by Advocate General Julie Kokott:
Is it compatible with the fundamental rights of the European Union to take the sex of the insured 
person into account as a risk factor in the formulation of private insurance contracts? That is, in 
essence, the question which the Court has to examine in the present reference for a preliminary 
ruling.7
At the onset of a very succinct judgment,8 the Court acknowledged that in the progressive 
achievement of equality between men and women ‘it is the EU legislature which (…) 
determines when it will take action, having regard to the development of economic and 
                                                
6 Amongst earlier decisions touching upon the subject of discrimination in insurance I would single out the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) as 
worthy of special notice in spite of its lack of direct impact on the promotion of equality, since in that case 
the Court dismissed an appeal sustained on the argument that differentiation in automobile insurance rates 
based upon age, sex and marital status was neither reasonable nor bona fide within the meaning of s. 21 of the 
Human Rights Code, 1981. See Lemmens, 2007.
7 Opening Statement of the Opinion, 2010.
8 The terseness of the reasoning in the judgment was criticized by Koldinská, 2011, 1632-1637. 
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social conditions within the European Union’. It then added that ‘when such action is 
decided upon, it must contribute, in a coherent manner, to the achievement of the intended 
objective, without prejudice to the possibility of providing for transitional periods or 
derogations of limited scope’ (Test-Achats, Para 20 and 21, added stress). In these lines there is 
an allusion to the true essence of the problem which would lead to the decision in Test-
Achats: that of a fundamental incoherence between Article 5(1) and (2) of the EU Gender 
Directive (Nanopoulos, 2011, 506-508).9
The ECJ recognized that when this directive was adopted the use of sex as an actuarial 
factor was ‘widespread in the provision of insurance services’ and as such might call for a 
gradual application of the unisex rule, its full application being preceded by ‘appropriate 
transitional periods’ (Test-Achats, Para 22 and 23).
The Court then evoked the often-quoted maxim that ‘the principle of equal treatment 
requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and different situations 
must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified’ (Test-
Achats, Para 28).10 Rather than make its own assessment of whether or not the distinction 
under analysis referred to comparable situations, the Court chose to rely on the legislature’s 
prior assessment, as set forth in the EU Gender Directive. Recital 18 ‘expressly states that, 
in order to guarantee equal treatment between men and women, the use of sex as an 
actuarial factor must not result in differences in premiums and benefits for insured 
individuals’, which meant that this directive was ‘based on the premis[e] that, for the 
purposes of applying the principle of equal treatment for men and women, enshrined in 
Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, the respective situations of men and women with regard 
to insurance premiums and benefits contracted by them are comparable’ (Test-Achats, Para 
30). And that was that.
The ECJ found that this premise did not sit well with a rule such as that contained in 
Article 5(2) of the EU Gender Directive. Based on the legislature’s premise and 
qualification, the Court concluded that it was incompatible with Articles 21 and 23 of the 
Charter, because it allowed a self-proclaimed ‘derogation’ from the rule of equal treatment 
of men and women to persist indefinitely rather than lead to its gradual application (Test-
Achats, Para 30 to 32).
The ECJ never provided an answer to the question whether or not taking one’s sex into 
account as a risk factor in the formulation of private insurance contracts was compatible 
with the fundamental rights of the European Union. The Court merely criticized the 
legislature’s poor drafting technique, leaving one to wonder whether the Court’s ruling 
                                                
9 The author highlights that the ECJ merely pointed to a deficiency in Art. 5(2) of the EU Gender Directive, 
which, through its indefiniteness, frustrated the Directive’s objective of combating discrimination under 
Article 19 TFEU and breached Arts. 21 and 23 of the Charter.
10 Reference was made in this instance to Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine, Para 23.
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might have been different if, rather than setting up a unisex rule and a derogation to that 
rule, the drafters of Article 5 had built the case of gender rating upon the ground of an 
alleged lack of comparability of situations – a door which had been left open by Recital 12 
of the EU Gender Directive.
This incoherence between Article 5(1) and (2) and between Recitals 18 and 19 of the EU 
Gender Directive did not come about by chance. In its Explanatory Memorandum to the 
proposal of what would become the EU Gender Directive, the European Commission very 
clearly stated its view that ‘differences of treatment based on actuarial factors directly 
related to sex are not compatible with the principle of equal treatment and should be 
abolished’ (Proposal, 2003, 8).11 The European Commission’s proposal coherently set forth 
the unisex rule which made its way to Article 5(1) and the justification contained in Recital 
18 (Proposal, 2003, Art. 4/1, Recital 13). A maximum transitional period of six years was 
then contemplated, Member States being allowed to ‘defer implementation of the measures 
necessary to comply with paragraph 1’ until such period had elapsed ‘at the latest’
(Proposal, 2003, Art. 4/2).
As it happened, this proposal did not attain the unanimous approval of Member States. 
Article 5(2) and Recital 19 of the EU Gender Directive were a product of the difficult 
negotiations that ensued. Theirs was the wording devised to express the solution of 
compromise that would eventually enable the unanimous adoption of this directive. 
Ironically, the ECJ’s ruling in Test-Achats occasioned a return to the origin, given that the 
prospective invalidation of Article 5(2) converted the existing derogation into something 
akin to the deferred implementation mechanism originally devised by the European 
Commission (Reich, 2013, 268-269).
I have stated earlier on that no argument is made in this article against the decision in Test-
Achats. To this I should add that I take no issue with the Court’s reasoning in Test-Achats. 
Its logic is impeccable. Nonetheless, I find it unfortunate that we have reached a point 
where the unisex rule ‘must be applied without any possible exception in relation to the 
calculation of individuals’ premiums and benefits in new contracts’ (European 
Commission’s Communication, 2011, Para 5) when (i) the rule, as it currently stands, has 
never been sanctioned by the unanimous approval of Member States; and (ii) neither has 
the premise, upon which it rests, that taking one’s sex into account as a risk factor in the 
formulation of private insurance contracts is always incompatible with the fundamental 
rights of the European Union been subject to a full scrutiny by the ECJ.
                                                
11 The European Commission also expressed the view that this conclusion was ‘in line with the ruling of the 
European Court of Justice in Coloroll, to the effect that different contributions for men and women to an 
occupational pension scheme are discriminatory’ (also at p. 8).
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3. WHAT WE SHOULD EXPECT THE FUTURE TO HOLD, NOT ONLY IN 
THE SUBJECT OF SEX DISCRIMINATION BUT ALSO IN RELATION TO 
DIFFERENTIATIONS BASED ON TWO OTHER RISK FACTORS: AGE 
AND DISABILITY
3.1.Could there be a re-run of the Test-Achats ruling?
In 2008 the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Directive on 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Proposal, 2008) as a follow-up to the EU Race 
and Gender Directives. In 2009 the European Parliament issued its own proposal 
amending the Proposal (Proposal, 2009). Although several years have gone by since this 
proposal was first adopted by the Commission, debate over it is still on-going, the Italian 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission having 
recently refuelled it by releasing a joint statement underscoring the need to make progress 
on this proposal.12
The insurance-related provisions of the amended Proposal bear little resemblance to those 
of the EU Gender Directive. In the original Proposal, the European Commission had 
recognized that ‘age and disability can be an essential element of the assessment of risk for 
certain products, and therefore of price’ (Proposal, 2008, 8);13 and that ‘the use of age or 
disability by insurers and banks to assess the risk profile of customers does not necessarily 
represent discrimination: it depends on the product’ (Proposal, 2008, 5). It had also 
announced that it would ‘initiate a dialogue with the insurance and banking industry 
together with other relevant stakeholders to achieve a better common understanding of the 
areas where age or disability are relevant factors for the design and pricing of the products 
offered in these sectors’ (Proposal, 2008, 5).
In the amended Proposal, as it stands, no ‘derogation’ is proposed to the non-
discrimination principle, the proposed wording making it reasonably clear that some 
differentiations based on age and/or disability would be permitted, not by releasing 
financial service providers from the principle of non-discrimination, but because in such 
cases different treatment ‘should not be regarded as constituting discrimination’ (Proposal, 
2009, Recital 15).14 Therefore, if the proposed wording should remain the same, there 
should be no cause for concern with a possible re-run of the ECJ’s argument in Test-Achats, 
                                                
12 See the summary and main conclusions of the Joint High Level Event on Non-Discrimination and Equality 
held in Rome on 6-7 November 2014.
13 There is no definition of ‘disability’ in the Proposal, but the term could be broadly defined so as to include 
all ‘those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with 
various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others’ (UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006, Art. 1(2).
14 See also Art. 2(7) of the Proposal, 2009.
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there being no inherent contradiction in the insurance-related provisions of the amended 
Proposal. 
3.2. Should there be a re-run of the Test-Achats ruling?
3.2.1. Sex as a risk factor
What about the ruling itself and its restrictive impact on the freedom of contract? In Test-
Achats the ECJ did not tackle the question whether there is a sufficient substantive 
justification – in other words, a good enough reason – for an outright ban on gender rating 
– whether taking one’s sex into account as a risk factor in the formulation of private 
insurance contracts would be incompatible, in every instance, with the fundamental rights 
of the European Union. Indeed, the premise that gender-rating is always incompatible with 
the principle of non-discrimination has yet to be validated.
Discrimination in insurance as a topic seems to summon a head-on collision between two 
apparently very different egalitarian accounts of distributive justice: on the one hand, there 
would be an ideal of justice fundamentally grounded on the notion of human dignity, on 
individual rights and liberties; an ideal which resonates with the Kantian categorical 
imperative that no human being should be treated simply as a means to an end but rather 
as an end in him or herself. On the other hand, there would be the ideal of justice more 
commonly known in the insurance industry as actuarial fairness, where, in order to treat 
equal situations equally and different situations differently in the exact measure of that 
difference, that is to say, in order to have each person pay a premium that exactly matches 
his or her own individual risk, insurers must disregard what is unique about each person 
and focus on (a limited number of) characteristics that allow them to classify that person 
into a risk group. 15
This is so because at the root of the insurance business is the law of large numbers, which 
is a principle of probability theory according to which, the larger the number of analogous 
exposure units independently exposed to loss, the closer the actual loss will be to the value 
of the expected loss (for instance, Aitken, 2010, 102). In a nutshell, ‘insurance is about 
transforming uncertain adverse events with uncertain outcomes into statistical events with 
certain outcomes: the expected losses that the payment of the premium reflects’ (Landes, 
2014, 1). If they are to do that, insurers must treat persons as numbers, so to speak. Is this 
incompatible with the fundamental rights of the European Union?
                                                
15 The Supreme Court of Canada took note of this conflict between ‘the determination of insurance rates and 
benefits’ and ‘traditional human rights concepts’ in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), at 
pp. 322-323. See also Thiery, 2006.
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Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union has the same legal force as the treaties of the 
European Union. Article 21(1) reads as follows:
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
Discrimination based on ‘any ground’ is prohibited. The ECJ regularly evokes the maxim 
that ‘the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be 
treated differently, and different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such 
treatment is objectively justified’ (Test-Achats, Para 28).16 This will be so regardless of the 
ground relied upon in order to discriminate against someone. However, it makes a 
difference whether or not the ground for discrimination is on the list. Those that are on the 
list are the grounds that have been identified as being most likely to lead to discrimination, 
because historically they have been major sources of discrimination. Any differentiation 
based on a listed ground is presumed wrong but this is presumption is not an absolute one: 
differentiations will be allowed when the situations in question are found not to be 
comparable or when an objective justification is provided for such differentiation (Thiery, 
2006, 9).17
In an earlier paper I have put forward the proposition that a twofold test aimed at 
narrowing the rules allowing insurers to differentiate on the basis of a ‘suspect 
classification’ should be used so as to separate admissible criteria of differentiation from 
inadmissible forms of discrimination (Rego, 2014).18 This test consisted of the following 
two questions: (1) is there evidence in support of the conclusion that the statistical findings 
under consideration have an explanation that is unrelated to some form of past 
discrimination? This question should be answered affirmatively in order for the 
differentiation to pass this part of the test, since statistical analysis, by using past data to 
predict the future, can be used as an instrument to perpetuate past injustices in a way that is 
incompatible with the promotion of equality. (2) Comparing the actuarial factor under 
scrutiny with every other possible factor, is there evidence to support the conclusion that 
that there is no other known factor which (i) would have been more suitable as a predictor 
of the relevant outcome or (ii) which would have been equally or even slightly less suitable 
for that purpose from an actuarial perspective but which would have been less burdensome 
from a human rights perspective? This question should also be answered affirmatively in 
                                                
16 Reference was made in this instance to Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine, Para 23.
17 The authors argue that ‘the legal possibility of justification of unequal treatment could function as the key 
to reconciling these different views on fairness in insurance classification and to bridge the insurance “group” 
tradition and the “individualistic” human rights tradition’.
18 The remainder of this paragraph contains a summary of the views I have put forward in that paper.
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order for the differentiation to pass this part of the test, for the use of a suspect 
classification as a convenient surrogate criterion for other, more determining features 
would also fall short on promoting equality.
It is not the job of legal researchers to separate the statistical findings that can from those 
that cannot be traced back to discrimination. I suspect most would fail this test, so I shall 
focus on the one area where I believe sex might stand a chance of passing both legs of the 
test: life insurance.
Every time and everywhere in the world women seem to outlive men. There is much 
debate on the reasons behind this gap both from a sociological and from a biological 
perspective (Seifarth, 2012). To the extent that social factors are found to explain the gap, 
these results might well be traced back to discrimination, as happened with the undisputed 
statistical finding that on average, white Americans live longer than black Americans, which 
formed the basis of different pricing by American insurers until the practice was eventually 
eradicated in the 1960s (Gaulding, 1995, 1659–1660; Olshansky, 2012). Nonetheless, in 
spite of the differences in opportunities that appear to explain the race gap in the United 
States, black women still outlive white men in the U.S.
Inasmuch as biological factors are found to lie behind the sex gap, sex as a risk factor does 
have a chance of one day passing the first leg of the test. Indeed, as set forth in Recital 12 
of the EU Gender Directive, differences in treatment which ‘result from the physical 
differences between men and women do not relate to comparable situations and therefore 
do not constitute discrimination’. Mere correlation will not suffice, but if a causal relation is 
found then different treatment does have a chance, because, to the extent that the reason 
behind the statistical finding lies in biology, it will not be due to some past form of 
discrimination. Of course in order for this differentiation to pass that first leg of the test it 
will not be enough to establish that the sex gap is partially caused by biological factors. A
time may come when such factors might be the only ones left influencing sex differences in 
longevity, in which case different treatment would be in the clear.
Surely the use of sex as a risk factor will not pass the second leg of the test if it is used as a 
surrogate for other, more determining features. The European Commission has found that 
even in life insurance insurers’ use of sex was based on ease of use rather than real value as 
a guide to life expectancy (Proposal, 2008, 8).19 Other factors, such as marital status, socio-
economic background, employment, regional area, smoking and nutrition habits, were 
shown to be more relevant. But what if sex is used in addition to, rather than instead of, all 
the other more determining features?
Even if current actual usage of sex as an actuarial factor had been found lacking in every
single instance, it is submitted that this is not a good enough reason to stop testing. The 
                                                
19 See also the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 2010, maxime Para 67.
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presumption of wrongness that goes along with differentiations based on a suspect 
classification is just that – a presumption. If in the case of sex as an actuarial factor this 
presumption currently proves very difficult, perhaps impossible to rebut, this is not the 
same as establishing that in abstract all gender-rating would necessarily entail a violation of 
the principle of non-discrimination. And yet every use of sex as a risk factor is currently off 
limits in the European Union, without any possible exclusion, as a practical result of Test-
Achats.
At this point I should like to refer to the use of statistical findings in the field of evidence-
based medicine. Since the 1950s there has been a slow but steady paradigm shift in the 
healthcare decision-making process towards a practice of ‘integrating individual clinical 
expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research’
(Sackett, 1997, 3). Since then, various studies have been undertaken comparing traditional 
clinical and model-based statistical diagnosis methods, to the overwhelming conclusion that 
these mechanical versions of Dr. House20 systematically outperform their human 
counterparts, proving to be on average 10% more accurate in diagnosing individual 
patients’ medical conditions (Grove, 2000). It is one thing to identify a pre-existing disease 
on the basis of the symptoms that the patient is already experiencing and quite a different 
thing to estimate a person’s time of death. Nonetheless, in both scenarios statistical 
findings are used to make a more informed decision over something for which not enough 
information is available. It would be safe to assume that in all these studies the patient’s sex 
would be one amongst many pieces of information fed to the model so as to obtain a 
diagnosis. It is hard to point the accusing finger at this practice in the face of such ample 
evidence that this recourse to statistical data actually improves our perception of the 
individual.
This goes to show that statistical findings may serve as a tool for the better understanding 
of the individual, doing away with the notion that the group-based approach to the 
individual would always entail a head-on collision with human rights.
3.2.2. Age and disability as risk factors
Every suspect classification bears its own history. Whereas in the U.S. the greatest effort 
has been placed in combatting racial discrimination, 21 in Europe more emphasis has been 
laid on ensuring equal treatment between persons of different nationalities and of different 
sex. Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1958) 
already laid down the ‘principle of equal remuneration for equal work as between men and 
women workers’. Since then, equal treatment of men and women gradually ‘took its place 
                                                
20 House is an American television series originally broadcast by Fox.
21 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 1995.
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at the forefront of EU social policy’ (Ellis, 2012, 24).22 Sex is foremost amongst the suspect 
classifications listed in Article 21 of the Charter. Risk factors such as age or disability have 
thus far not been subject to as intense a scrutiny in the European legal arena. Although 
they have also been singled out in Chapter III of the Charter, when it comes to the 
promotion of equality the strongest language is to be found in Article 23.23
The European Commission seems more willing to accept insurers’ use of age or disability 
as risk factors, having expressed the view that at least ‘under certain conditions’ such use 
would ‘continue to be allowed’ under the Proposal, as ‘it would not be considered 
discriminatory’ (European Commission’s Communication, 2011, Para 20).
The European Commission sustains the view that when it comes to assessing one’s life 
expectancy persons of a different age are not in a comparable situation, which is to say that 
in life insurance the use of age as a rating variable is not discriminatory (European 
Commission’s Communication, 2011, n. 17).
Even though my background in law does not place me in the best position to conclude 
whether and to what extent age is a determining factor in risk assessment, I believe that it 
would be safe to assume that when it comes to life insurance, and more broadly in the field 
of personal insurance, insurers should be able to demonstrate that a person’s age is an 
indispensable element in the evaluation of that person’s risk.24
However, if a lesson should be taken at all from Test-Achats, it would be that insurers 
should beware of making use of suspect classifications in circumstances where no such 
evidence is readily available or widely accepted by the scientific community. Age is used by 
insurers as a risk factor in a multitude of insurance classes, oftentimes as a surrogate for 
behavioural traits such as reckless driving.25 The amended Proposal’s emphasis on 
‘objective and verified medical facts’ and ‘undisputed medical knowledge that comply with 
                                                
22 Marano, 2012, argues that race, ethnicity and sex, differently from age and disability, would no longer be 
‘socially accepted criteria for distinguishing within the European Union’.
23 Sex discrimination is the subject of Article 23, age is the relevant factor in Articles 24 (young age) and 25 
(old age) and disability in Article 26. At least with regard to age, there is ample consensus that ‘a wider range 
of justifications for different treatment on grounds of age may be available than in relation to grounds such as 
sex or race’ (Schiek, 2011, 778). The author argues that the ECJ adopts a looser or more lenient standard of 
judicial review in age-related differentiations than in cases dealing with sex or racial discrimination (where a 
strict standard of scrutiny was found to be more appropriate).
24 See Civic Consulting’s Study on the use of age, disability, sex, religion or belief, race or ethnic origin and sexual orientation 
in financial services, in particular in the insurance and banking sectors (2010), commissioned by the European 
Commission, , pp. 54-55. According to this study, it is in life insurance that a person’s age ‘most obviously 
operates as a key risk factor’, life insurers having access to ‘data which is likely to be fuller and more 
convincing than in any other line of insurance’ (p. 54). This conclusion would be consistent with the finding 
by Kuschke, 2014, that ‘[s]tatistical discrimination is often used and tolerated, for example, when older people 
are charged more for life insurance, and people with a medical history are charged more for health insurance’ 
(p. 5).
25 According to Civic Consulting, 2010, there is ‘convincing evidence illustrating the relationship between 
driver age and the incidence of motor accidents’ (p. 39).
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medical data collection standards’ (Proposal, 2009, Recital 15)26 appears to be aimed at 
leaving out precisely this sort of behavioural stereotyping.
The Proposal’s reference to proportionality (Proposal, 2009, Article 2(7)27 is also 
significant, as it would be unduly burdensome to stop using age as a risk factor in personal 
insurance but perhaps not elsewhere. Proportionality also appears to call for insurers to 
abandon the use of ample age bands because their use might lead to a disproportionate 
difference in treatment between two persons of a slightly different age but who happen to 
fall on different sides of an age band boundary. In addition, if the use of age as a rating 
variable is found not to be discriminatory in personal insurance, its use as a ground for 
refusing to provide insurance altogether might be found not to comply with the principle 
of proportionality.28
The same could be said of the refusal to provide insurance to a disabled person. However, 
disability as a risk factor poses an additional set of challenges to the insurance industry: that 
related to the nonexistence of reliable statistical data. An insurer might be led to deny 
coverage to a disabled person because it simply lacks the data that it would require in order 
to evaluate that risk, such as in the case of a person suffering from a heart condition who 
has been subject to ground-breaking surgery, there being no data drawn from the past with 
which to assess that person’s life expectancy. Lack of reliable statistical data does not 
appear to be a valid excuse for differentiation under the amended Proposal.29
4. CONCLUSION
The unisex rule on insurance premiums and benefits first came to being with the entering 
into force of Article 5 of the EU Gender Directive, in 2004, its effectiveness significantly 
impaired by a so-called derogation. However, it took on an absolutist turn by virtue of the 
prospective invalidation of that derogation by the ECJ in the Test-Achats ruling, effective as 
from 21 December 2012.
                                                
26 See also Proposal, 2009, Article 2(7).
27 Final section of Article 2(7) of the amended Proposal: ‘The service provider must be able to objectively 
demonstrate significantly higher risks and ensure that the difference in treatment is objectively and reasonably 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are proportionate, necessary and effective.’.
28 This conclusion appears to be in line with the findings by Kuschke, 2014, that ‘one should not allow 
insurers the luxury of an absolute exclusion based solely on a general discriminatory factor’ (p. 33) and that 
‘[f]rom the data extracted from case law, judgments and rulings in the national reports, it appears that the 
outright refusal of providing cover is often held to be unjustified, yet that premium adjustments or a 
differentiation in the selection of benefits and policy terms and conditions was more readily justified and 
acceptable’ (pp. 33-34).
29 Which, again, would be consistent with the finding by Kuschke, 2010, that ‘[t]he mere absence of statistics 
is not enough to irrefutably prove that there is no alternative to the discriminatory practice. Difficulty alone in 
providing statistical or actuarial information has never been accepted as an excuse for discriminatory conduct 
that is contrary to human rights’ (p. 33). In this instance the report refers in particular to Zurich Insurance Co. v. 
Ontario (Human Rights Commission).
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In the legislative process that resulted in the EU Gender Directive, the absolutist version of 
the rule had failed to obtain the unanimous approval of Member States. In the judicial 
process that would lead to the Test-Achats ruling, the assumption upon which it rests that 
taking one’s sex into account as a risk factor in the formulation of private insurance 
contracts is always incompatible with the fundamental rights of the European Union was 
never directly scrutinized by the ECJ.
Even if current actual usage of sex as an actuarial factor had been found lacking in every 
single instance, even if it is currently very difficult, perhaps impossible to provide an 
admissible justification for the practice of gender-rating, this is not a good enough reason 
to stop testing. There is no substantive justification for the absolutist version of the unisex 
rule: the premise that in abstract gender-rating necessarily entails a violation of the principle 
of non-discrimination has yet to be validated.
From a formal point of view there should be no cause for concern with a possible re-run of 
the ECJ’s argument in Test-Achats, there being no inherent contradiction in the insurance-
related provisions of the Proposal, as amended by the European Parliament. From a 
substantial point of view there is good cause to believe that insurers will be able to provide 
evidence in support of the conclusion that at least in the field of personal insurance age 
should continue to be used as a risk factor. However, some of the current practices 
involving both age and disability as risk factors, such as that of using age as a surrogate for 
behavioural traits or of refusing coverage on the ground of lack of available data on a given 
disability, might not pass the test of compatibility with the fundamental rights of the 
European Union. 
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